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Chris Botha (CB): Tell us about yourself and your
involvement in police oversight in the world.
Peter Tinsley (PT): I served in the Canadian
military for 28 years, first as a military police
officer and then as a military lawyer. In 1999 I was
appointed as Director of the Special Investigations
Unit of Ontario, an agency tasked with the
investigation of police incidents involving death or
injury. This appointment allowed me to assist in
reforming and rebuilding community trust in the
police. During the years 2003-2005 I served as a
war crimes prosecutor in Kosovo as well as in
Bosnia and Herzegovina after which I was
appointed as Chairperson of the Military Police
Complaints Division. I have participated in
oversight and rule-of-law issues in Afghanistan,
Somalia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador,
Cuba, Romania, Northern Ireland, Portugal, Iraq
and Brazil. I am a past member and president of
the Canadian Association for Civilian Oversight
for Law Enforcement and presently I am the
executive director of the Institute for Justice Sector
Development, a non-government organisation
created to assist nations whose justice systems are
in transition.
CB: Why oversight at all?
PT: The answer to your question is perhaps best
tied up in the Latin maxim, often associated with
Plato, of quis custodiet ipsos custodies – who
guards the guardian or, more particularly, who
will watch the watchman? The police typically
have the legal authority to carry out their duties,
holding extraordinary powers over other citizens,
including the use of lethal force. In a constitu-
tional democracy one should recognise that those
with special powers – especially those with powers
impinging directly on individual liberty, like the
police – will require special accountability for the
use of those powers. Therefore one cannot have
the police policing themselves only. One should
have alternative models of oversight additional to
any internal models that the police may have, such
as professional standards units or units tasked
with internal affairs. To this end, it must be clear
that I refer to independent, civilian oversight
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external to the police when I speak about
oversight in policing. 
CB: Are the police not capable of policing
themselves?
PT: One should not necessarily assume that the
police are not capable of policing themselves, or
that the police are not to be trusted. Human
nature, however, necessitates oversight over the
police. The police are typically tightly-knit, highly
insular organisations often accused of ‘covering up’
abuses of power by their colleagues – a
phenomenon in many places referred to as ‘the
blue wall’. This aspect of human behaviour
obviously needs to be checked constantly.
However, I suggest to you that the major reason
for independent oversight is a function of
perception and the need of communities to be
assured that there is accountability, that the rule of
law is being applied. Further, there is a need on the
part of the police to maintain the confidence of
the community. 
CB: Allow me to pick up on something you have
just said: how important is the power of
perception?
PT: A perception is formed quickly. The more the
community notes issues of police abuse or bad
behaviour, which can be through vicarious means,
the more the police run the risk of being perceived
abusive or behaviourally unacceptable. This
cannot be fixed with some spin-doctoring. Instead,
the police will have to address the perception in a
transparent way. If not, the perception turns into a
stereotype, labelling the police as bad. This
stereotype is very difficult to turn around. This is
where oversight structures come in: I have a firm
view that the overarching purpose of independent
oversight is the promotion and maintenance of
community confidence in policing, police services
and individual officers.
CB: Community confidence in the police through
oversight?
PT: Indeed. You see, we often look at the
complaint only; the allegation by an individual
citizen that the police have offended his or her
rights or that he or she was abused by the actions
of the police. Of course, that is part of the
oversight role and should be addressed effectively.
However, we must look at the underlying issues as
well. What caused the police to act in the way that
they did? Often, we will find deficiencies in
supervision, training and equipment as underlying
factors. During a recent inquiry into the conduct
of Canadian law enforcement officials a judge in
my country made us aware of this. Judge
O’Connor was of the opinion that the full value of
oversight can only be achieved if we look to more
than the actions of an individual police official;
oversight must of necessity also be a review
mechanism for systemic causative factors. In a
case brought before the Military Police
Complaints Commission, the Commission found
that the officers involved acted entirely in
accordance with their protocols and their training.
However, the Commission found that the training
and protocols were substantially flawed and in fact
provided for the abuse of the rights of people so
handled. Therefore, the Military Police changed
the practices of the police in instances such as the
one brought before the Commission. So, whereas
it is certainly important for the offended citizen to
see his or her complaint dealt with, oversight has
even greater value when the community as a
whole sees a just system at work. Oversight
actions may thus maintain, or in other cases
restore, community confidence in the police.
CB: In South Africa, given our history, we
developed and introduced a multiple account-
ability model of oversight on many levels, from
parliamentary structures through (the then)
National and Provincial Secretariats for Safety and
Security (now Police), Community Police Forums
and the ICD, to name but some of them. We were
interested in civilian oversight because we needed
to prevent unjust and abusive behaviour as it
presented itself in our past. How did civilian
oversight become part of the Canadian landscape?
PT: It is by no means a new concept. 1829 may be
a long time ago, but I believe that the principles of
policing offered by Sir Robert Peel in the United
Kingdom then, still have relevance today. One of
those principles states clearly that the ability of
the police to perform their duties is dependent
upon public approval and that the police are
required to secure and maintain the respect of the
public. The concept of oversight originated in
Australia in the early ‘70s and it spread, also to
Canada. Most nations have done what you have
done – they have advanced the concept of
oversight in response to the demands of their
people, probably since we have no binding
international obligations regarding oversight.
However, by implication and interpretation, we do
have international instruments in existence that
are relevant to the exercise of police powers. The
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights are examples of these instruments.
Beyond these, international human rights law is
generally satisfied by the legal (and preferably
constitutional) recognition of certain rights of
persons suspected or accused of crimes,
particularly upon arrest or detention, along with
access to judicial remedies for breaching these
rights. There are others, such as the 1989 United
Nations Guidelines for the Effective
Implementation of the Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials and the 1993 ‘Paris
Principles’, which specified minimum standards
for national human rights oversight bodies. All of
these played a role in the determination of the
Canadian models for oversight. 
CB: Before exploring the Canadian model, would
you care to explain the policing landscape in
which this model is executed?
PT: Canada is a federation comprised of ten
provinces and three territories. We have about 
70 000 police officers employed at federal,
provincial and municipal levels. Historically,
control of the police was exercised by police
commissions or boards. However, these structures
came to be viewed as corporate boards of
directors administering police services and really
as part of the police. They were not positioned to
fulfil the objective oversight role that
communities were demanding. Today we have at
least one fully developed civilian oversight agency
in each of the ten provincial jurisdictions and at
the federal level. Every officer holding law
enforcement powers is subject to some form of
independent oversight. In the last four years alone
three new more robust agencies have been
established, while two other existing agencies
have been scheduled for revitalisation and greater
empowerment by their respective governments. 
CB: Was this change in role and number, from
the commissions/boards to a more widely spread
and robust structure of civilian oversight, the
result of community demands?
PT: The change was actually affected by both
community demands as well as progress in the
discourse of oversight, where a relatively
theoretical concept was actually structured in our
society. An example of the former may be found
in the establishment of Ontario’s Special
Investigation Unit in 1990. The event that
triggered this establishment was the shootings of
two young men from a minority community
within a two-week period. The event caused
government to react with the purpose of assuring
the community that the deaths would be properly
investigated. The changes were not only limited to
the number of oversight agencies, but also took
place because of a developing trend to expand the
role performed by, and the processes available to,
oversight agencies. One now finds that the
traditional Canadian model of oversight, which
focused on review, appeal or audit following
internal police reaction to a complaint, is shifting
towards a ‘first instance’ jurisdiction where
conduct complaints are made to the oversight
bodies directly. In fact, in two provinces the
jurisdiction for criminal investigations involving
police officers and the performance of their duties
has passed to independent civilian bodies. This
same change in regime in the criminal context
will soon be implemented in a third province and
is being called for elsewhere.
CB: What is the attitude of the police towards
civilian oversight?
PT: Historically, the attitude of the police towards
civilian oversight was one of resentment and even
active resistance by both police leaders and
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frontline officers. In my experience, the reaction
of the police was mostly one of ‘people outside the
police do not understand what a police officer
faces on a daily basis nor are they qualified to
conduct investigations’. Of course, this view has
been proven to be categorically incorrect in
Canada and elsewhere. With some police leaders
and officers a resistance mode continues to be the
case, but overall it is fair to say that oversight is
now generally accepted with a far higher degree of
cooperation. It is recognised as a necessary part of
police professionalism and the maintenance of
community confidence.
CB: Why the change in attitude?
PT: The police, both leaders and frontline
officers, have come to understand and accept that
credible independent oversight bodies can serve
to validate their performance in a way that they
cannot do themselves. But, to achieve this attitude
in the police it is critical that the oversight
agencies are highly professional in every sense of
the word and that they are seen as credible, not
just by the community but by the police
themselves. It takes a constant demonstration of
standards and professionalism by the oversight
body to achieve and maintain credibility.
CB: Canada, in my understanding, enjoys a high
standard of policing. The police services are
generally well funded, efficient and effective. In
fact, many of us in South Africa have always seen
your federal police service, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, or ‘Mounties’, as some sort of
icon in policing, a police service to be respected
for how they do the job. Why then the increase in
the number of oversight agencies and the
discourse on the role of oversight in society?
PT: Indeed, we have excellent police services and
polls suggest that the majority of Canadians
generally hold the police in high regard. The
‘Mounties’ that you refer to are in fact a much
revered historic national symbol of Canada.
However, flawed or deficient police services are
clearly not the motivation for the changes. It is the
very importance that Canadians attribute to the
police and their role in society, our quality of life,
and our unwillingness to allow inevitable instances
of poor performance or misconduct of any degree
to go unchallenged, that has been the primary
impetus of change. This, I would suggest, is
informed by the significance attributed to the rule
of law and the belief that all must be equal, and
seen to be equal, under the law. Also, we are
experiencing a general lessening of tolerance for
breaches of individual rights by the government or
any agent thereof.
CB: Eventually, I’m getting to the Canadian model
of oversight. Please tell me about it.
PT: Yes, there’s so much to talk about… In
Canada, we do not claim to have identified the
best or perfect oversight model. In fact, experience
has taught us that no one specific model of
oversight agency fits the needs of all communities,
which may vary widely in terms of size,
demographic make-up and other environmental
factors and customs. One is able to identify four
general groupings of models in Canada, as
identified by their various processes or powers.
Some agencies may initiate a complaint, may
direct who will investigate the complaint, may
refer the complaint to an independent adjudicator
and may have binding disposition power. Others
may adjudicate the complaint itself, or may
investigate, while still others may only recommend
disposition. Be that as it may, we have certain
immutable, fundamental characteristics in our
system spanning, as it were, all four general
groupings. These are:
• Independence (both real and perceived). 
Oversight agencies must be free of government
direction in terms of the performance of their
mandate
• Appropriate empowerment by law, not by 
some lesser instrument of policy or
governmental directive
• Sufficient resources to properly and 
professionally perform their mandate
• Transparency of process and fairness to all, 
including the police
• Sufficient and credible expertise and 
experience of all involved in the oversight
process
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• Communication with both the broader 
community and the police, since rights do not
exist if they are not known.
CB: How many complaints are received by
Canadian oversight agencies?
PT: Some years ago, the Canadian Association of
Civilian Oversight of Law Enforcement adopted a
statistical analysis system. We found that a police
service should reasonably expect to receive
complaints amounting to between five and ten
per cent of the number of police officers
employed. So, for every 100 police officials
employed, we could expect between five and ten
complaints. Of course, these are complaints
received, not necessarily upheld.
CB: In your case then, with 70 000 police officials
over all jurisdictions, you should expect between 
3 500 and 7 000 complaints to investigate. What
does this cost, what are the budgetary
implications for the state, and how many people
do you need to deal with the complaints
effectively?
PT: I don’t have available national figures but I
could provide an example based on Ontario –
Canada’s second largest province at approximately
900 000 square kilometres (a significant factor in
terms of the cost of service delivery), a population
of approximately 12 million and approximately 
27 000 police officers, both municipal and
provincial. Ontario is one of the provinces with
two oversight agencies, one dealing with
complaints in an administrative/disciplinary
context and the other with criminal investigations
of police involved in incidents resulting in death
or serious injury, including sexual assault. The
former employs approximately 40 personnel and
the latter 87, 39 of whom are regionally based ‘as
needed’ investigators. The combined budgets of
these two agencies are approximately 16,5 million
dollars. 
CB: Can you elaborate on the training provided
to investigative members of oversight agencies in
Canada? Are investigators sourced from the
general public, or from policing agencies?
PT: The sourcing of staff, particularly
investigators, has long been a contentious issue,
with the police and broader community having
very contrary views. While the notion of police
secondments has been pretty much rejected, it is
quite common to find mixed investigative staff
members from both police and non-police
backgrounds. With appropriate safeguards in
place to avoid the perception of a conflict of
interest for retired police officers, and a heavier
training quotient for those without prior police
experience, this compromise works effectively.
Appropriate training for all staff is critical. In
most oversight agencies it is a significant budget
item with training obtained from academic
institutions, specialised providers and even police
colleges. 
CB: Lastly, what advice would you give to South
Africa on civilian oversight?
PT: I would not presume to advise the
government of South Africa without having a
much better grasp of the state of police
community relations. However, when asked that
question, I cannot help but think of the significant
message in the title of the Commonwealth
Human Rights Initiative’s 2005 Report – ‘Police
Accountability: Too Important to Neglect, Too
Urgent to Delay’. Independent civilian oversight is
a concept that has spread exponentially over the
last several decades. It has certain core
requirements, as stated earlier, that when adapted
to the circumstances of a community in a suitable
model has proven to not just be of benefit to the
community, but also as a multiplier of police
service effectiveness. So, I would say that it is a
worthy consideration everywhere. 
 
